AI Generated Summary
- As long as those limits remain, the movement is less a revolutionary project and more a geopolitical instrument—one that survives not because of its vision, but because of its usefulness to others.
- When veteran Canadian journalist Terry Milewski describes Pakistan’s backing of the Khalistan movement as something that “makes absolutely no sense,” he is pointing to a contradiction that has long been hiding in plain sight.
- Can a genuine self-determination movement exist when its lifeline is a state that would crush the same demands within its own borders.
When veteran Canadian journalist Terry Milewski describes Pakistan’s backing of the Khalistan movement as something that “makes absolutely no sense,” he is pointing to a contradiction that has long been hiding in plain sight.
On the surface, Islamabad’s support for Khalistan appears tactical: encouraging separatist sentiment in Punjab as a way to needle India. But dig even slightly deeper and the logic begins to unravel. Pakistan itself governs half of historic Punjab since the 1947 partitoin, a region rich in Sikh history, culture, and sacred sites. Yet there is no serious tolerance—let alone encouragement—for Sikh political self-determination within Pakistani Punjab. The idea of Khalistan, it seems, is useful only so long as it remains someone else’s problem.
This selective enthusiasm exposes the transactional nature of the relationship. As Milewski bluntly observes, the Khalistan movement has depended on Pakistani support “from the very beginning,” stretching back to the 1940s. That dependency is not incidental; it is existential. Without safe havens, funding channels, and logistical backing linked to Pakistan, the movement would struggle to sustain itself internationally, let alone on the ground.
And therein lies the paradox. A movement premised on carving out a sovereign homeland in Punjab cannot realistically survive by ignoring half of Punjab’s geography. Yet the moment Khalistani advocates were to extend their claims to Pakistani territory, the welcome would evaporate. As Milewski wryly notes, they would be greeted in Pakistan with the same cold dismissal Donald Trump faced when floating the idea of buying Greenland.
This contradiction reveals a deeper truth: Pakistan’s support is not ideological, cultural, or rooted in Sikh aspirations. It is strategic and conditional. Khalistan is useful precisely because it does not challenge Pakistan’s territorial integrity. The movement’s survival depends on respecting that unspoken red line.
For Khalistan’s supporters, this raises uncomfortable questions. Can a genuine self-determination movement exist when its lifeline is a state that would crush the same demands within its own borders? And what credibility remains when a cause is sustained not by popular mandate, but by geopolitical patronage?
Milewski’s comments cut through the rhetoric to expose a hard reality. Pakistan’s backing may keep the Khalistan movement alive, but it also defines its limits. As long as those limits remain, the movement is less a revolutionary project and more a geopolitical instrument—one that survives not because of its vision, but because of its usefulness to others.
